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Abstract
Cryptographic mechanisms are used in a wide range of applications,
including email clients, web browsers, document and asset management
systems, where typical users are not cryptography experts. A number
of empirical studies have demonstrated that explicit, user-visible crypto-
graphic mechanisms are not widely used by non-expert users, and as a
result arguments have been made that cryptographic mechanisms need
to be better hidden or embedded in end-user processes and tools. Other
mechanisms, such as HTTPS, have cryptography built-in and only be-
come visible to the user when a dialogue appears due to a (potential)
problem. This paper surveys deployed and potential technologies in use,
examines the social and legal context of broad classes of users, and from
there, assesses the value and issues for those users.
Keywords: Security, cryptographic controls, legal aspects, regula-
tion, risk management
1 Introduction
Cryptography mechanisms are embedded in a range of software applications, in-
cluding Internet banking and online shopping. These cryptographic mechanisms
are, in some cases, entirely hidden from end-users; other mechanisms require the
users to interact with them directly, and we call these user-visible applications
of cryptography. These mechanisms may involve users entering passwords or
passphrases for secret keys; other examples include dialogues related to resolv-
ing problematic SSL certificates on web sites. The types of application that
we are concerned with include email, web browsing, e-commerce and document
management systems; these applications are used widely, particularly by non-IT
expert users. In all cases, the interactions that an end-user has with crypto-
graphic mechanisms and applications take place in a social and legal context.
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This context includes the user’s objective, such as buying a book from an online
store or communicating with friends or colleagues.
This paper surveys and analyses the use and impact of these cryptographic
mechanisms and techniques for general users. We highlight common methods
and techniques, along with problems in their deployment. We start by describing
the legal context of these non-expert end-users, examine security usability issues,
then outline the technology at hand. We then use scenario-based analysis to
structure a thematic survey of the applications of user-visible cryptography.
We draw the themes together and discuss issues such as trust, deployment,
endpoint security and their overall effect on the use of these cryptographic mech-
anisms, given the users’ context. We will conclude that in general, other mitiga-
tions are important in these user interactions, and that substantial automation
is appropriate where cryptography is required. We also argue that there are
some limited cases where user-visible applications of cryptography has signifi-
cant value for typical end-users.
1.1 Structure
First, we outline the legal context for our assessment of cryptography in sec-
tion 2: this work is initially from an English and Welsh perspective, but ac-
knowledges the cross-border aspects of electronic transactions. We continue by
surveying existing related work concerning usability and security in section 3.
Section 4 briefly introduces the common, underlying technology that con-
cerns this work. We address emerging approaches in later discussion. Section 5
sets out the scope of our survey. It describes the type of user we are concerned
about (a “general Internet user” stereotype) and introduces ten user stories that
we use to motivate our later discussions. Section 5.2 identifies three categories
of user-visible applications of cryptography.
Sections 6–10 examine the application of cryptography, grouping the user
stories together thematically. We consolidate and expand the discussions in
sections 6–10 and make some overarching comments in section 11 before con-
cluding in section 12.
2 Legal context
This work is based primarily in a English and Welsh legal context. However,
the general observations should be sound in similar jurisdictions, particularly
derived legal systems such as Canada and Australia. Moreover, the observations
related to issues of data protection and transmission (which impact on several
scenarios) are also applicable to European jurisdictions subject to EU directives.
We structure this part of the discussion into two broad areas: contracts and
signatures (integrity matters), and confidentiality and privacy.
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2.1 Contracts and signatures
The formation of contracts requires agreement, and that agreement is ideally
recorded. However, a contract can be made verbally as well as by hand-written
signature, but the burden of demonstrating a verbal agreement is greater. Con-
tracts may impose confidentiality and similar requirements on one or more par-
ties.
More relevant to computing, e-commerce requires that the making of con-
tracts is mediated by computers. Thus a simple email indicating agreement,
or completing an online form by clicking “accept” can be sufficient to form a
contract. This brings us to the use of “signatures”, where examples include
hand-written signatures, stamps or images of a company officer’s signature,
email signatures that are automatically appended, typed signatures, and so on,
all the way to cryptographic digital signatures. Thus we see that “signature”
is a rather ambiguous term: Gutmann’s tutorial slides include greater detail
in this area (Gutmann, 2007). Additionally, Mason (2011) gives a summary of
some forms of electronic signature, and comments “the person relying on the
signature (such as where you say you did not sign a cheque, and the bank has
paid money out of your account on a cheque) must prove it was your signature
where you dispute it was not your signature. This is the same for electronic
signatures, although the vendors selling digital signatures try to reverse this
rule.” A thorough coverage of the legal issues surrounding electronic signatures
is in Mason’s book (Mason, 2012).
Some legislation explicitly addresses the recognition of electronic signatures,
such as the Electronic Communications Act 2000 (HMSO, 2000). A result of
this is that a wide range of statements can be legally considered an “electronic
signature”. For example, Monitor, a regulatory body for part of the UK’s
National Health Service, interprets this to mean that
“the following are all examples of an electronic signature
• Typed name
• E-mail address
• Scanned image of a signature
• Automatic e-mail signature” (Monitor, 2008)
This point applies to other media, such as faxes. Chapter 6 of Mason (2012)
provides a detailed analysis of the form of electronic signatures and comments
on cases illustrating the variability of legal decisions. Mason also quotes the Law
Commission writing on ‘Electronic Commerce’, including “[. . . ] the validity of a
signature depends on its satisfying the function of a signature, not on its being a
form of signature recognised by the law” and “Even if a click is less secure than
a manuscript signature, reliability is not essential to validity.” This illustrates
a distinction between the validity of a signature (essentially its acceptability)
and the reliability of the method or form of the signature.
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The later Electronic Signature Regulations 2002 (HMSO, 2002) introduce
the notion of an “advanced electronic signature [which means an electronic sig-
nature]
(a) which is uniquely linked to the signatory,
(b) which is capable of identifying the signatory,
(c) which is created using means that the signatory can maintain
under his sole control, and
(d) which is linked to the data to which it relates in such a manner
that any subsequent change of the data is detectable”
where an electronic signature itself “means data in electronic form which are
attached to or logically associated with other electronic data and which serve as
a method of authentication”. Additionally, qualified certificates are introduced
which have additional liability provisions. These Regulations follow the Euro-
pean Directive 1999/93/EC on a Community framework for electronic signa-
tures (European Parliament and Council, 1999; European Commission, 2011)
“addresses three forms of electronic signatures: Basic electronic signature [. . . ]
Advanced electronic signature [. . . ] “Qualified electronic signature” [. . . ]” and
these are criticised in Krawczyk (2010). Mason (2012) comments that the Euro-
pean Commission “may make further efforts to encourage the take-up of digital
signatures, in the face of overwhelming evidence that nobody seems to want
to use them, unless they are forced to do so.” A more general coverage of the
evolution of documents and the use of technology, including cryptography, is
given by Blanchette (2012). Although sometimes from a French
Information from computer records themselves also has value. The Civil
Evidence Act 1995 (HMSO, 1995) specifically places weight on the evidential
value of a computer record rather than the admissibility of the record itself.
Thus records of businesses and public authorities can be relatively easily used
as evidence. A similar provision exists in the US court system in the form of
Rule 803 (Federal Evidence Review, 2012).
There is recognition of the need for reliability in the processes surrounding
computer systems and evidence. For example, BS 10008 (British Standards Institute,
2008) and the associated BIPs (Shipman, 2008; Shipman and Howes, 2008;
Howes, 2008) provide substantial guidance; supplementary material includes
a workbook to assist audit.
Note that other than advanced electronic signatures and some references in
BS 10008, nothing above explicitly requires any form of cryptography. Indeed,
this, at least so far, poses no problem for the making of contracts in this context.
2.2 Confidentiality and privacy
A major issue for information systems concerns data protection legislation, pri-
marily, the Data Protection Act 1998 (HMSO, 1998), an enactment of the 1995
European Union Data Protection Directive. This imposes obligations; for ex-
ample, principle 7 states “Appropriate technical and organisational measures
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shall be taken against unauthorised or unlawful processing of personal data and
against accidental loss or destruction of, or damage to, personal data.” The
definition of “appropriate” is, of course, subject to each individual case. Formal
notions of “data controller” (a person or persons responsible for the process-
ing of data) and “data processor” (for outsourcing of processing) are given in
this Act. Substantial guidance exists, along with a range of standards such
as the ISO 27000 series. Besides regulatory requirements, information usually
has value to both individuals and businesses, regardless of the presence or ab-
sence of personal data. All this needs protecting in the traditional senses of
confidentiality, integrity and availability.
Classic examples involve sensitive medical records, bank account and credit
card credentials. Within the UK, the Information Commissioner’s Office is re-
sponsible for enforcement. Some remedies are also available for data subjects
(such as demanding the correction of erroneous records). We remark that public
reports of legal action following security lapses are unusual, with Sony’s recent
security problems being an exception (Kuchera, 2011). However, such lapses
tend to be either failure of access control or loss of devices or media with plain-
text data. We discuss this further in section 11.
Privacy is related to, but not synonymous with confidentiality. In this survey,
we do not need to consider these difference further with the exception of noting
the recent regulations regarding cookies (Information Commissioner’s Office,
2012) due to European Directive 2009/136/EC. Compliance with these regu-
lations is interesting due to the contrast with consent (partially discussed above
in relation to clicking “accept”): for example, “Implied consent is a valid form
of consent”. Additionally, there are broader matters of (mis)use of web tech-
nologies (including cookies) in malware and surveillance.
3 Usability and security
Previous work assessing the effectiveness and value of cryptography has exam-
ined usability as well as PKI issues. These areas dominate this paper, so we
discuss them here. We also introduce further literature where relevant in the
sequel.
A classic paper in the usability field is Whitten and Tygar (2005) which con-
cerns the ability of users to use PGP 5.0: “Our 12 test participants were gener-
ally educated and experienced at using email, yet only one-third of them were
able to use PGP 5.0 to correctly sign and encrypt an email message when given
90 minutes in which to do so”. More generally, Furnell and others have inves-
tigated the usability of end-user software at length, and find continuing prob-
lems with interfaces (Furnell et al., 2006; Furnell, 2007; Ibrahim et al., 2010;
Sweikata et al., 2009; Cranor and Garfinkel, 2005; Gutmann and Grigg, 2005).
Ho et al. (2010) examined the setup of home wireless networks, and found that
“users did not understand the difference between access control lists and en-
cryption, and that devices fail to properly notify users of weak security config-
uration choices”. They proposed a configuration wizard to partially mitigate
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some of these problems. Zurko and Simon (1996) introduced the term “user-
centered security” and discussed the application of usability testing to secure
systems. Some attention has also been paid to the education of users in the use
of security-related software (Reid et al., 2005).
Others comment on the software itself. Kapadia (2007) remarks “I found
that [OpenPGP applications] were unusable with nontechnical correspondents
because it required them to install additional software”, which relates to some
of our remarks on systems such as IronPort and Hushmail in section 7.3. We
used a similar approach of server-side cryptography in support of document
security (Brooke et al., 2010).
Other work assesses what the users understand about security concerns:
Gross and Rosson (2007) interviewed twelve users with differing roles to answer
“What do users know about security and threats?”; “How do users manage their
security concerns?” and “Who do users believe is responsible for security, and
how do they perceive their role in security?”, noting that “entire organizations
can be brought down by security failures”. Later work suggests that users do
differentiate between security (and privacy) concerns and more general computer
problems (such as hardware failure) (Gross and Robson, 2007).
Previous work has also examined PKIs and questioned their effectiveness
and usability (Gutmann, 2003; Straub and Baier, 2004). Moreover the need
for PKIs, electronic signatures, etc. is not clear in practice (BILETA, 2011)
(and our earlier comments in section 2.1). Alternatives involve opportunistic
encryption (Garfinkel, 2003b), key continuity management (Gutmann, 2004;
Garfinkel and Miller, 2005), identity-based encryption (Shamir, 1985; Martin,
2006) and email-based identification and authentication (EBIA) (Garfinkel, 2003a).
However, we are not concerned with some other security properties, such as
anonymity in systems such as Mixminion (Mathewson and Dingledine, 2004).
More broadly, notions of return on security investment (National Institute of Standards and Technology,
2005) attempt to capture the return on investment in security processes, policies
and infrastructure, though this focuses on capital investment rather than value
delivered to end-users. An interesting variation is due to Herley (2009), who
argues that users’ rejection of much conventional security advice (for example,
ignoring SSL certificate warnings) is rational. This is on the basis of out-of-
date advice and false positive warnings against the cost (to the end-user) of
acting on this information. Herley examines password rules, phishing site iden-
tification and SSL certificate warnings and comments “the burden [to the end-
user] ends up being larger than that caused by the ill it addresses”. Similarly,
Bo¨hme and Grossklags (2011) argue that human attention is a scare resource.
They too make the point that user inattention can be rational, and produce
a simple game model to illustrate typical options for users. A possible way to
reduce the demand on attention is the use of social navigation, as suggested by
Goecks et al. (2009). They present prototype tools which describe other users’
security decisions (e.g., for cookies and firewalls), although it proved less useful
for more complex or ambiguous decisions.
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4 Underlying technology
Cryptographic technologies typically address confidentiality and integrity issues.
The underlying mathematical concepts of these technologies are the same: both
employ a range of asymmetric and symmetric algorithms (e.g., RSA and AES
respectively). Typical operations include
• key generation, both for long-lived public/private keys as well as transient
session keys;
• encryption and decryption (confidentiality);
• signing and verification (integrity); and
• hashing (e.g., as part of signing, or deriving a key from a password or
passphrase).
We do not dwell on the mathematical approaches (an appropriate starting point
is (Schneier, 1996)), but instead on how they are encapsulated into the appli-
cations and made visible to the user. Later, in section 7.2, we see that this
encapsulation is not trivial; for example, different software can interpret nor-
malisation of messages in different ways resulting in false bad verification of
signatures.
As well as understanding the basic capabilities and scenarios of interest for
non-expert end-users (section 5.1), we also must clarify the technical context in
which they work. We briefly summarise several major groups of cryptographic
software; our end-users will likely use one or more of them either explicitly or
implicitly.
CMS or Cryptographic Message Syntax, based on PKCS#7, is described by
RFC5652 (Housley, 2009) and describes a message format for crypto-
graphic messages. It is usually used alongside an X.509 public key infras-
tructure. The best example of CMS is its use in S/MIME email messages.
X.509 itself defined in RFC5280 (Cooper et al., 2008), provides the most com-
mon format for public key infrastructure (PKI) data for the Internet.
This usually leads directly to the certificate authority trust/validity model.
Certificate revocation lists are also supported in X.509; however, the On-
line Certification Status Protocol (OCSP) (Myers et al., 1999) perhaps
provides an alternative giving more timely updates.
SSL/TLS Significantly for our example users, SSL/TLS is widely deployed on
websites and mail servers. (Although not identical, we use SSL and TLS
as synonyms in this work.) In this role, it is a near-ubiquitous protocol
with native support in common web and mail clients. Public keys (as
X.509 certificates) are obtained in the initial SSL/TLS negotiation. The
relying party then needs to verify that the presented certificate is signed
by a trusted root certificate, possibly via intermediaries. We return to this
issue in section 11.4, including comments on alternative approaches.
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OpenPGP defined in RFC4880 (Callas et al., 2007), is an alternative to S/MIME
for email messages as well as for general file encryption and signing, based
on Zimmermann’s PGP. X.509 certificates are not used in OpenPGP; in-
stead a web of trust is usually used instead. The web of trust is not
the only option: single and multiple key validation models are supported.
Both PGP and GnuPG support this standard and are broadly interoper-
able.
Other interesting technologies timestamping services, key servers (for OpenPGP
keys), and other means of obtaining up-to-date keys, such as integration into Ac-
tive Directory and LDAP. The Simple Public Key Infrastructure (SPKI) (Ellison,
1999; Ellison et al., 1999; Ellison, 2004), described in experimental Internet
RFCs, concerns a more local naming scheme. We will return to some key man-
agement issues later in the discussion. More user-friendly approaches include
Hushmail and similar services (discussed in section 7.3).
5 Users and user-visible applications of cryptog-
raphy
We will define what we mean by user-visible applications of cryptography in
section 5.2, and first describe the type of users we are concerned with.
5.1 Users of interest and scenarios
The typical users of interest are
1. domestic users with tasks such as social email, online shopping and e-
banking;
2. office workers, using software such as office productivity applications, un-
dertaking sensitive discussions by email, or working with sensitive data
such as personal data;
3. supervisors and managers interacting with other staff, authorising, ap-
proving and auditing business processes;
4. non-IT-specialist users installing or upgrading software, e.g., operating
system updates, plugins such as Adobe Flash and entertainment software.
A scenario-based approach (Carroll et al., 1998; Rosson and Carroll, 2002)
allows us to structure the analysis by end-user concerns. From an analysis of
the literature and incidental observations of end-users we identified a set of ten
typical scenarios where cryptography plays a role:
1 — Browsing a social website
2 — Buy goods via a website
3 — Online banking
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4 — Social email
5 — Sensitive discussion by email
6 — Agree a contract by email
7 — Install or upgrade software
8 — Internal application process
9 — Signing a form
10 — Data confidentiality
Browsing social websites was common to most computer users, with Facebook
particularly prevalent. Most users had experience of ordering from the Internet,
such as Amazon, and using the Internet for banking. Social email is perhaps
less common than previously (we speculate that social sites such as Facebook
account for this; however, this was not investigated further), although all used
email as part of their work. Those in sensitive areas (healthcare, criminal justice)
often engaged in discussions of cases by email. Few had agreed formal contracts
by email, but negotiations that had an impact on subsequent contracts were
commonly mediated by email. Nearly all users had installed software, often
games or plugins as well as downloading applications to mobile devices (e.g.,
iPhones, Android devices). The larger organisations had formal processes that
involved rigid workflow processes as well as requirements to “sign” forms in
some way. The final user story, dealing with confidentiality of data, concerned
those users working with “personal data”.
The ten scenarios are a representative set to allow us to break down user
interactions with cryptography. We do not claim they are complete; there are
other specialised cases that we do not attempt to address. Instead, we are
concerned with a “general Internet” stereotypical user without specialist skills
or needs; we do not address scenarios such as the use of ATM cards or RFID-
based and similar access control systems. Later sections group these user stories
thematically; subsequently, we consolidate the points in section 11.
Before we can analyse these scenarios, we must say more about our assump-
tions relating to our users and their environment. As we have suggested already,
we do not address relatively small, specialised user groups with very high se-
curity demands. These specialised populations can reasonably be expected to
undertake appropriate training and be supplied with suitable equipment for
their tasks. Instead, we are interested in day-to-day use of computers.
A common assumption to all these users is that they have basic computer
skills, e.g., word processing and email, but they are not IT specialists and have
no need (nor interest, often) to be IT specialists.
Our analysis required us to make assessments of risk. We followed the com-
mon method of identifying the likelihood as low, medium or high, and the impact
as low, medium or high. A typical approach then assesses the overall risk as
low, medium or high from the likelihood and impact. In the sequel we discuss
the risks identified, starting with the highest.
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5.2 User-visible applications of cryptography
There are three categories of user-visible applications of cryptography that we
concern ourselves with here.
1. The most obvious user-visible application of cryptography is the direct,
elective invocation of a cryptographic tool, e.g., PGP or GnuPG.
2. Indirect but still explicit, elective use of cryptography involves examples
such as
• asking an S/MIME email client (e.g., MS Outlook) to encrypt or sign
an email;
• encrypting or signing a document in an office application (e.g., MS Of-
fice, LibreOffice); or
• selecting encryption in a ZIP archive application (e.g., 7-Zip).
Sometimes this is a simple as ticking a box to select encryption and giv-
ing a password which is subsequently used (in some form) as a key to a
symmetric algorithm. Others, such as signing office documents, requires
at least a user certificate for an asymmetric algorithm or a full PKI.
3. Much cryptography occurs in the background. Web browsers and email
clients can automatically use SSL, discussed further in Sections 6 and 7.
This is implicit and should be unobservable by the user until there is a
problem, such as an out-of-date or otherwise invalid certificate causes the
client software to warn the user.
The examples above in categories 1 and 2 usually affect the recipient. A
signed document might not require any special interaction, yet the client soft-
ware may report the state of the signature, possibly raising dialogues or showing
warnings. In other cases, the recipient may be completely unaware of the sig-
nature (e.g., an office document with an embedded signature, or a multipart
signed email) or conversely, the document may be unreadable without using
specialist software (such as ASCII-armoured signed emails).
Encrypted emails and ZIP archives nearly always require a direct interac-
tion to give the relevant key, usually in the form of a password or passphrase.
For an email, the relevant private key may already be accessible for automatic
decryption, as in some configurations of MS Outlook.
Similarly, the first two categories may require explicit key management on
part of the users.
In this survey, we concern ourselves with the examples above where the
user becomes aware of the presence of some problem or issue in the underlying
structure. Importantly, the user does not necessarily have to relate this to a
cryptographic system at all; consider Ho et al. (2010)’s comments on users not
understanding the difference between different concepts.
Although we will discuss some issues of endpoint security, mostly in sec-
tion 11.3, this is in relation to the overall risk for different scenarios. Thus we
do not discuss the use of passwords and other authenticators beyond that.
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6 Web
We now examine the ten user stories, grouped thematically. We start with three
typical web-based scenarios.
User story 1 — Browsing a social website Alice reads and sometimes posts
on a social website, e.g., FaceBook or web forums. We suggest that the
overall risk here is low: antisocial behaviour and account hijacking are
the main risks, but the assets concerned are limited, at least from Alice’s
perspective. A greater risk might be posed by Alice posting something
she later regrets.
User story 2 — Buy goods via a website Alice wants to buy something
from an e-commerce site. She will necessarily use her credit card or a
service like Paypal. Either way, at some point, she has to pay money in
the expectation that the purchase is delivered as specified. The risks are
high here: phishing, website spoofing and non-delivery of goods are the
canonical examples, along with theft of payment and other details from
the recipient site.
User story 3 — Online banking Alice views account details and pays bills
using her bank’s online service. The risks here are as in the previous story:
bank details have an obvious value to criminals.
Although relatively obvious, we can find illustrations of these user stories in An-
derson’s text 2008 in sections 23.3.3, 23.3 and 1.3 respectively, and additionally
for the latter two user stories in Cronin (1998). Evidence of interest in social
networking more broadly can be seen in SOCIALNETS (2009).
Secure web connections via the HTTPS protocol are relevant to these three
user stories. In each case, Alice will have to point her web browser to the correct
URL: this URL might have been bookmarked from a previous visit, found via
a search engine or typed in, perhaps from an advert in a newspaper, or from
memory.
Before we consider HTTPS directly, let us address the risks. The main risk is
the compromise of login credentials: these credentials are useful to attackers for
harassment/nuisance via social media, theft from online banking or misuse of
credit card details. Compromised credentials can then be used to call into ques-
tion the integrity of any transaction involving those credentials or to present the
possibility of compromised credentials for “plausible deniability”. Additionally,
the re-use of passwords, even on ostensibly low-security websites clearly permits
further exploitation of credentials: “a substantial number of the randomly veri-
fied email accounts revealed that 75 percent of the users rely on the same pass-
word to access both their social networking and email accounts” (BitDefender,
2010).
At some point, payment details are required. The web browser is redirected
to a “secure page” accessed via HTTPS if the entire site is not already HTTPS
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based. At this point, we encounter our first problem. The reliance on certifi-
cate authorities for X.509 certificates to bootstrap what is essentially a trust
relationship has been highlighted previously (Perlman, 1999) and was brought
sharply into focus with the Comodo compromise in 2011 (InfoSecurity, 2011)
and the more recent issues with DigiNotar (Corbet, 2011). A secondary issue
to the Comodo and similar compromises concerns the limited use of CRLs and
OCSP by clients to revoke bad certificates. Mozilla Security Blog (2011) re-
ports that the offending certificates were quickly revoked using both the CRL
and OCSP mechanisms. We see other examples of this later. Trust in the
computers concerned is a deeper problem (Parno et al., 2010).
Common advice given to users for e-commerce transactions typically includes
“Check that the padlock sign is shown on your browser and that the URL in-
cludes https.” Regardless, users still find it difficult to assess whether or not “a
connection [to a web site] is secure” (Friedman et al., 2002). Complications in-
clude extended validation and more sophisticated phishing attacks (Jackson et al.,
2007). Kirlappos et al. (2012) argue that trust seals are ineffective, and con-
clude that “automatic verification of authenticity” is required. Rapidly chang-
ing browser environments are also likely to confuse users; for example, Mozilla
Firefox has changed its indication of secure connections several times (Shultze,
2012). What Alice really needs is sufficient evidence that her web client is con-
nected to the correct server and that the connection to that server is encrypted.
Observation of some user populations at our institutions (in our cases, aca-
demics and students) demonstrates that the security afforded through CAs is
brittle at best. Warning dialogues are often disregarded (Likarish et al., 2008):
we have effectively trained our users to ignore the warnings because they have to
workaround problems. One of the ICT departments at the authors’ institutions
included instructions to set up a wireless connection which explicitly directed
the user to accept an invalid certificate because of the server’s setup.
The difficulty in assuring that the client has connected to the correct server
is one factor that enables phishing. In one sense, this is an artefact of a global
naming scheme (the DNS) and we see that SPKI suggests local naming schemes
in closed groups. But this poses difficulties for, say, the banking scenario.
A moderately na¨ıve solution for online banking would be for a bank to tell
users the fingerprint of the correct certificate: but we do not believe that any
but the most security-conscious user would actually check this. Essentially, the
computer is a tool and fine management of it is simply not a conscious matter
for the user. Hence our focus on user-visible applications of cryptography.
The issue of root certificates aside, the actual usability is relatively good: we
do not see people having great difficulties making e-commerce purchases. We
return to this in our discussion in section 11.
7 Email
Our next set of scenarios relates to use of email, at different levels of sophisti-
cation and hence, with different requirements for use of cryptography.
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User story 4 — Social email Alice wants to email her relative or friend,
say, Bob. The overall risk is low: the main asset is the email, and it
is unlikely to be particularly valuable although potentially embarrassing.
From Bob’s perspective, someone pretending to be Alice is a very low risk.
User story 5 — Sensitive discussion by email Suppose Alice and Bob work
together and need to discuss a serious problem with a particular task.
Email is one possible medium. The risks revolve around confidentiality.
User story 6 — Agree a contract by email Alice agrees by email to un-
dertake some work for for a small business. The main risk here concerns
non-repudiation by the business or vice versa. Thus it is not so much an
issue of making the contract but one of evidencing that the contract has
been properly made, i.e., that the elements of consideration, intention,
offer and acceptance are all present.
An example of sensitive email is given in Gaw et al. (2006). Movement of
email services into the “cloud” is advancing, with outsourcing to Google and
Hotmail in evidence, and along with suggestions for the US Federal Govern-
ment (Cloud Computing Security Working Group, 2011).
Email is, for many users, an effective communication medium, although the
prevalence of both spam, which we do not directly address, and large volumes
of legitimate email can degrade this. The essential risks here are twofold: one
is the loss of confidentiality, the second risk concerns spoofing or modification
(integrity) and non-repudiation.
This is a good example for opportunistic encryption (Garfinkel, 2003b).
A mail user agent or mail submission agent connecting to a server may use
SSL/TLS to encrypt the conversation with the server. This has the same prob-
lems as for web servers, i.e., how does the user know that they have connected
to the correct server? But differently from the HTTPS example, mail servers
are arguably harder to spoof. Two major classes of mail server are those within
a particular business and those for the user’s ISP. In both cases, we should
have a good level of confidence that the relevant part of the DNS is correct,
at least from the client’s perspective, and that regardless of the certificate, we
have connected to the correct server. Some users may be in a closed or partially
restricted environment (e.g., heathcare) further reducing the incidence of prob-
lems. However, this observation leads us to a further point: within a particular
business, how many users are likely to be actively sniffing the network?
We develop this point further. Older, hub or broadcast-type networks are
very easy to monitor for other users’ traffic. Newer switched wired networks are
harder to monitor although some switches are believed to degrade to operate
as hubs. Wireless connections are an instance of broadcast networks, which are
potentially easier to monitor unless encrypted, say, WPA2. Since it is relatively
cheap and easy to arrange for a mail server to offer SSL/TLS connections, it is
proportionate to do so and thus not worry about any possible sniffing by insiders
or those with access to the network.
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Mobile users provide a complication. The argument above does not apply
to a user temporarily visiting another organisation or using a hotspot as they
cannot rely on the infrastructure to the same degree (for example, there is more
delegation of DNS). This is no worse than the general HTTPS case.
Thus for most users, they can assume that their ISP or business mail server
does receive their email, and opportunistic encryption using SSL/TLS defeats
any local sniffing. However, if the ISP or local mail server is not trusted, the
user may be reluctant to trust this encryption of the connection. Further, this is
only transport encryption, not storage encryption. The email must be stored on
the mail server, even if only transiently, as email must be stored temporarily on
each server that handles it. Certainly in the case of a business mail server, there
is a significant broader problem: if the users cannot trust their own servers, then
what else is wrong with the infrastructure?
7.1 S/MIME and OpenPGP email
This leads us to consider S/MIME and OpenPGP for emails. Capable users
might choose to generate key pairs and use one of these cryptosystems to en-
sure confidentiality of their messages. However, these are, by observation, a tiny
minority of the population as a whole. One barrier to adoption of this approach
for secrecy is the need for the recipient to have a public key; this results in mul-
tiple attempts to create public keys on demand, e.g., identity-based encryption.
We discuss these and similar approaches such as Hushmail in section 7.3.
Moreover, within a particular organisation—with an assumption of a trusted
infrastructure— the emails are already safe due to opportunistic encryption,
other than at the endpoints. These endpoints are the sender’s and receiver’s
computers. Here, we can remark that some user’s security hygiene is negligible,
e.g., our remarks about screenlocks on page 25. It is, of course, notable that
users’ desktop machines are a major entry point of malware, via the web or
USB sticks. For example McQueen (2010, slides 108–109) reported that 20% of
users inserted a thumb drive found in a public place into their computer. In our
discussion (section 11) we further comment on endpoint security.
Returning to the point of opportunistic encryption, we note that discovery of
the correct settings can be challenging. We speculate that increased outsourcing
of email services in large organisations may be to blame. Some software, such
as Apple’s Mail, seems remarkably robust. Mozilla’s Thunderbird needed much
help to connect to the student mail system at one of the authors’ institution.
Additional aggravations concern the use of passwords and passphrases used
for securing cryptographic keys. For example, some systems do not require a
password after importing a PKCS12 file: the private key is accessible on demand.
Thus someone with access to that desktop machine can read any email, even if
it is encrypted to that particular key.
Further, key management remains a major problem. Gutmann (2003) re-
ports that obtaining a key from a public CA “takes a skilled technical user
between 30 minutes and 4 hours work”. Little has changed since then, and in
any case, these certificates are “low value”. Local CAs using the SPKI model
14
S/MIME OpenPGP
MS Outlook native
Mozilla Thunderbird native Enigmail plugin
Apple Mail native
Alpine native & filters various filters
Table 1: Email clients examined
can more easily issue certificates for their own servers, and can ensure that
centrally provisioned machines have the relevant root certificate installed. But
external users do not benefit from this.
The problem goes on step further. We have seen examples of users in the pub-
lic sector sending emails with S/MIME signatures. “Good”, one might think.
However, the certificate issuer is one of these local CAs: we can decide to accept
the issuing certificate in our mail client. But some software, such as gpgsm takes
the decision that certificate revocation lists must be checked: this is correct in
our view. At this point, we discover that the machine which serves the CRL is
not accessible outside of that organisation. The value of the CRL, and thus the
certificate overall, is massively reduced. Moreover, the particular characteristics
of the organisation in our example make it very unlikely that unauthorised users
would have access to even that organisation’s buildings, let alone the computers
within them.
Even if a user perseveres and obtains a key for use with their email client,
configuration and setup often remains challenging. Dialogues remain unintuitive
for the most part. In the course of other work, we counted 8–9 steps to import
an S/MIME certificate from a PKCS12 file, depending on email client.
So we assert that there is no real value in signed email except in the case
where users have both good reason to fear spoofing or modification or their
messages, and when they have had opportunity to confirm, ideally face-to-face,
that the cryptographic certificates are correct.
7.2 Interoperability and robustness
Even if we addressed the issues above, interoperability is poor in contrast to gen-
eral use of web browsers with HTTPS. We examined a range of email clients,
using versions current in early 2011, as listed in Table 1. Although S/MIME is
generally well-supported natively, OpenPGP often requires plugins and these are
not available for some MUAs, notably MS Outlook. This means that communi-
ties of users need to agree on the cryptosystem to be used; yet these communities
are often not well-defined and have porous boundaries.
We sent and received emails using either S/MIME or OpenPGP. For OpenPGP,
we examined both “inline” and MIME/OpenPGP messages. Encrypted mes-
sages were uncomplicated and mostly worked. On some occasions, they were
simply not recognised and were ignored by the client: the common feature in
theses cases is that the multipart/encrypted message was not the top-level
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MIME part. However, such messages are entirely valid in terms of MIME and
arguably, could occur in practice when digests are sent.
Verification of clearsigned messages was much more brittle. Again, some
clients required that the multipart/signed message was the top-level, or it
would be ignored and not displayed. Others had trouble verifying messages they
had sent themselves! Clearsigning is strongly preferred over opaque messages,
as clearsigned messages are readable by users who do not have software capable
of verifying the signature.
When we find that some mail servers also rewrite MIME messages causing
clearsigned messages to fail to verify, we conclude that the technology remains
too brittle and interoperability is relatively weak. This is disappointing after
so many years. The problems are well-known, including suitable treatment
of whitespace, line-endings and character sets (indeed, we had to address the
same canonicalisation process when working with XMdoc (Brooke et al., 2010)).
That email systems remain so brittle in respect of clearsigned messages mitigates
against their use, as false negative verifications degrade the usefulness of signing
even further. They lead to the same issue that we encounter with web server
certificates, where users are trained to ignore the warning messages, if they
actually check the signature at all. Indeed, we speculate that it would take
other users a long time to notice if we sent signed emails with a revoked key.
7.3 Transparent solutions and gateways
Sending an encrypted email requires that the recipient has a key to decrypt it.
Both symmetric and asymmetric cryptosystems have well-understood problems.
Identity-based cryptosystems are rooted in Shamir (1985)’s work; other work
includes Martin (2006). Typically, the key generating centre is a trusted third
party, and can compromise the system. This is not necessarily a problem,
given that some trust is required at some point. Boneh and Franklin (2003)
provide an example of an identity-based encryption system, and give several
useful properties such as restriction to dates and security classifications, easy
revocation and delegation of decryption keys. Cocks (2001) describes a scheme
based on quadratic residues, and comments that multiple authorities “will be
desirable”. This point is addressed by Lee et al. (2004), Gentry (2003) and
similar work, although the fine details do not concern us at this point. In
general, we need to trust some infrastructure, and simpler schemes have obvious
single points of failure and escrow.
A related approach is to make this as transparent to the end-user as possible,
particularly in terms of software requirements which we relate to the earlier
quote in section 3 from Kapadia (2007)). We use IronPort (Cisco, 2011) and
Hushmail (Hushmail, 2011) as exemplars here. Both can use a Java applet
so that decryption occurs on the client machine. Additionally, both offer an
option for processing messages on the server machine via a secure web session.
In this latter configuration, these services are not significantly stronger than
HTTPS as described above: this is recognised in such services (Hushmail, 2010,
2011; Singel, 2007). Some implementations send the email directly and only the
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decryption key is escrowed, which has some positive impact.
A positive side effect is that policy engines such as IronPort can be used
to reduce the “fat-fingering” of emails by requiring that all out-of-organisation
emails are subject to policy enforcement (e.g., encryption, or simply disallowing
some outbound traffic).
Thus our point remains: for a typical user, what threats does this mitigate?
The endpoints remain a problem: for example, some local users of health service
data receive messages via a secure email service of a similar design as discussed
above. But the data is stored locally, as plaintext. If we combine local plaintext
storage with a transparent approach and implicit trust in the service provider,
there seems to be little security advantage over opportunistic encryption of email
or a “secure web dropbox”.
Key continuity management (KCM) (Gutmann, 2004), based on imprint-
ing (Stajano and Anderson, 2000) or trust-on-first-use (as in SSH), are further
options: we implicitly trust the first contact and only warn if credentials change
unexpectedly. Garfinkel and Miller (2005) experimented with S/MIME, Out-
look Express and KCM, and concluded that “KCM is more secure than today’s
alternative to KCM: no cryptographic protection at all” but also “it is not
the panacea to the mail security problem for which we are looking”. Related
attempts include STEED (Koch and Brinkmann, 2011), which argues for end-
to-end encryption and (similar to earlier points) trust-on-first-use. STEED also
includes further attempts to make key management easier: automatic key gen-
eration and key distribution via DNS.
8 Software signing
User story 7 — Install or upgrade software Alice installs some software
from the Internet. How can she be sure that it is free of malware and from
the correct publisher?
The primary objective here is to ensure the integrity of the system as a
whole. Once installed, operating systems typically receive updates over their
lifespan, for example Microsoft (2007) and Debian (2010). Application software
is initially installed and subsequently updated. In all these cases, the intent is to
ensure that the “correct” software is installed or updated, in the sense it should
be “approved” or at least “certified” by someone responsible. The simplest case
is that the original publisher or developer has made the updates available, but
there is a an obvious competitive argument in favour of third parties making
plugins, updates, etc., available. Typical examples include drivers and updates
on Microsoft Windows and package signing in the Linux distributors, e.g., De-
bian’s checking of signatures via apt (Joey Hess and others, 2006).
We make much use of “scare” quotes in the previous paragraph: the exact
purpose or value of the software can vary between stakeholders. For example,
some vendors may wish to restrict the platform so that only software they ap-
prove is installed (perhaps for control of a “marketplace”), or to limit potentially
bad interactions of packages.
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The risks are obvious: malware can masquerade as “genuine” software, and
thus we make the reasonable leap to cryptographically signing software. We
observe that some security incidents in own institutions are due to attempts to
install software of relatively dubious origin.
From observation of users, we see two well-known issues:
• As with the web and email examples, users disregard warnings because
they obstruct the user’s intention: to install some software.
Note that we do not concern ourselves with policy issues. For exam-
ple, some system administrators may wish to ensure that only particu-
lar patches are installed; involuntary upgrades may break other software.
Additionally, some patches are large, and may inconveniently use dispro-
portionate amounts of bandwidth for roaming users.
• Software signing uses public key cryptography: thus some public keys
have to be trusted. We have the usual root trust problem as described in
section 6. Indeed, this scenario can be viewed as a subset of the connecting-
to-a-web-server scenarios.
9 Form signing
This set of user stories is somewhat different, and relates to applications in use
in specific domains and industries — particularly those with requirements for
signing electronic documents.
User story 8 — Internal application process An applicant, with the as-
sistance of his supervisors, completes part of an application form. Two
different department heads need to sign off various resources and indicate
their support, as well as obtaining certification from a finance department
clerk. This documentation is then forwarded for a final decision to be
made.
The risks are a little more subtle than some of our earlier user stories. If
everyone is cooperating and trustworthy, there is no problem. However,
some people do attempt to defeat the checks-and-balances in such schemes:
we discuss this further below.
User story 9 — Signing a form A variation on the agreement of a con-
tract: a publisher requests that Alice signs an agreement, e.g., our mo-
tivating example here is a transfer of copyright form. As in the earlier
example, this is a low risk example: the problem is to be able to provide
evidence if the agreement was subsequently challenged.
We have previously examined the issue of distributed non-centralised forms
with requirements such as integrity and auditability in Brooke et al. (2010).
One of the motivating scenarios there was our current Internal application pro-
cess (8) user story. A very specialised form of signing (certification, in this in-
stance) covers court documents, as described in (Reiniger and Francoeur, 2010).
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Some services provide a web-centric approach, such as Adobe’s EchoSign ser-
vice (Adobe, 2013).
However, we now look at the broader process in the event of a subsequent
problem, and compare with the “sign form” scenario.
A non-computer approach for the latter scenario is for the publisher to post
the form to Alice, who signs it and posts it back. A more common method is
to email a document, e.g., PDF, MS Word, and ask for a signed copy to be
scanned then emailed or FAXed. A final option (which the authors have seen
several times lately) is for the publisher to offer an option of signing the PDF
file using an X.509 certificate. Again, this causes a dependence on certificate
authorities as discussed earlier.
In common with the “agree a contract by email” user story, we note that
an email itself, even without any cryptographic measures, is likely to be suffi-
cient as evidence. Similarly, due to legislation such as the Civil Evidence Act
1995 (HMSO, 1995), the document signing scenario is relatively easy: we would
assert that the computer system is functioning correctly and the existence of
the records would be sufficient. One party would have to actively dispute the
validity of the assertion. Of course, cross-border issues complicate this, but all
agreements we have seen include choice of law clauses, thus mitigating this issue.
Interestingly, we can raise difficulties with demonstrating that a signatory
has seen and understood the terms of an agreement. Click-through agreements
are believed to be enforceable (Mason, 2011) although particular clauses may
not be.
9.1 Audit and integrity
Complications concern the splicing of documents, whether intended to subvert
organisational controls, or simply to expedite a process.
We assert that people are essentially trusting. Consider again the Internal
application process (8) user story above; a more specific instantiation is the ap-
proval of a course of training within an organisation (based directly on a real
system). The process itself is relatively involved, but a major problem in terms
of audit and good governance concerns the signing of these forms. In a purely
paper process, a single document should be signed by all the parties (applicant,
supervisors, department heads and finance clerk). But the difficulty of obtain-
ing all these signatures with an increasingly mobile workforce often results in
multiple signature pages being submitted for a given document. Worse, there
is no guarantee that the signatures are attached to the correct version of the
document: multipage documents can be easily spliced together.
The next step is to consider how these documents are handled when emails
become involved. The committee that makes the final decision on these doc-
uments now routinely sees a word-processed form, with some signatures on
printed pages and some printouts of emails from various principals asserting
their support of the application.
In both the purely paper process and the process involving emails there
is trust that no one is actually trying to defeat the system by presenting an
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application with putative signatures that are in some sense false. The emails are
being sent within the same organisation, using the same central mail service, and
thus those relying on the veracity of these emails and hand-written signatures
trust the system as a whole. Essentially, we assert that there is no demand in
typical domestic or business processes for cryptographic assurance of emails.
Interestingly, this appears to be backed by the experiences with qualified
certificates (e.g., (Krawczyk, 2010), referred to in Section 2): there is simply
no real market for them outside of very specialised demands. This is likely to
continue while there is no statutory requirement to use an advanced electronic
signature or qualified certificate, since the existing legal framework accepts the
name on the email as being sufficient replacement for a hand-written signature.
So a simple email is sufficient for authorisation and implicitly, also for audit
purposes, but is not what many in the information security sector would view
as sufficient for integrity.
10 Disk and file encryption
User story 10 — Data confidentiality Alice has some data on a laptop
computer that is the subject of data protection obligations. Laptops can
be lost or stolen relatively easily, thus the risk is medium or high.
Disk and file encryption is purely about confidentiality, with some large
examples described by Lane (2009). We suggest that this is the simplest of our
selection of problems. Essentially, media can be lost: making it hard for the
records on that media to be (ab)used is an obligation in most data processing
scenarios.
Examples are easy to find in the media; we are aware of local cases, e.g., in-
volving sensitive medical records. The Information Commissioner’s Office has a
range of press releases (Information Commissioner’s Office, 2011) detailing some
of these incidents. In terms of risk assessment, we suggest that this is one of the
most significant risks facing most organisations. Whereas we argue in our earlier
stories that the integrity of information is relatively rarely challenged, there is
a high likelihood of accidental loss of storage media and computing equipment;
similarly the type of information can range from trivial to highly compromising.
We initially suggest that this should be relatively easy to manage. A range of
software is available, including paid-for and free applications. Small installations
can rely on simple use of passwords, while larger organisations may use some
form of enterprise management capabilities such as Symantec’s PGP Whole
Disk Encryption.
As usual, we observe that the practicalities are not so easy. Discussions with
local SMEs during short (one-day) basic IT security courses demonstrate that
some simply do not recognise the need to protect data from inappropriate dis-
closure although the need for antivirus software is commonly recognised. Those
that do sometimes suffer from choice-paralysis: how do non-experts choose a
suitable piece of software?
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Built-in options are little better: “scary” but otherwise correct dialogues
about encryption passwords being critical deter users. The well-known costs as-
sociated with managing additional software, handling keys, issues with backup
and recovery, etc., become relevant. As a final remark, we note that a small, but
significant minority of our undergraduates found TrueCrypt’s dialogues confus-
ing: these students managed to overwrite existing files when they were trying
to create new file containers.
However, given the risks for most users, we argue that any reasonable disk
encryption is effective, as the aim is to prevent compromise due to accidental
loss and casual thieves, albeit not effective at dealing with determined attackers.
11 Discussion
We have examined a range of common applications. We now examine four
overarching themes in relation to user-visible applications of cryptography:
• risk and value;
• deployment problems;
• endpoint security; and
• trust problems.
11.1 Risk and value
We have identified a range of risks in our user stories above. We can place them
into three groups:
• risks best mitigated by user-visible applications of cryptography;
• low risks; and
• risks that are mitigated by legal, societal or other technological measures.
We now take these in turn.
11.1.1 Risks mitigated by user-visible applications of cryptography
The Data confidentiality (10) user story is an outlier compared to our other
user stories. It demonstrates an effective mitigation of the risk using user-visible
applications of cryptography, although problems such as the (mis)management
of encryption keys can occur. Essentially it can convert accidental and inevitable
loss of readable data on portable media into the loss of encrypted data. Thus
in this case, the use of cryptography is valuable compared to the risk. Even
then, it can be automated further by inclusion in the boot process. A diligent
attempt to use encryption can form part of the management of the legal risk
from, say, the UK’s Data Protection Act 1998.
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11.1.2 Low risks
The risks in some of these user stories are low as the impact of a breach is low,
for example in social websites and social email. The lower this risk, the less
justification there is for the costs —time, effort and money— for user-visible
applications of cryptography as distinct from technologies such as opportunis-
tic encryption. Users perceiving a low impact, whether consciously or uncon-
sciously, are unlikely to attempt to mitigate that risk.
11.1.3 Risks mitigated by legal, societal or other technological mea-
sures
The remaining medium or high risks can be mitigated by other means.
Although we have concentrated on UK (albeit primarily English and Welsh
and related systems such as Canadian and Australian) law, the legislative situ-
ation is similar in other jurisdictions. For example, for data protection issues,
European countries have their own implementations of the 1995 European Union
Data Protection Directive. Procedural and audit safeguards are often in place,
particularly relevant for environments where a relatively large number of users
may legitimately access data (such as in the health and law enforcement sectors).
Notably, cryptographic signatures typically have no added legal value over
other types of signatures (as described in section 2). This applies particularly
to the Buy goods via a website (2), Online banking (3) and Agree a contract
by email (6) user stories, and to a lesser degree, the two scenarios discussed in
section 9. The mitigation in all these cases is that the parties have recourse to
the legal systems, where courts would be asked to decide if a contract existed.
A simple email without a cryptographic signature may be sufficient for a court.
Chapter 8 of Mason (2012) discusses issues of liability further.
For financial transactions, reactive monitoring systems, as exemplified by
credit card companies, identify anomalous patterns of use which triggers out-
of-band authorisation to the credit card holder. This monitoring, along with
legal guarantees limiting the risk to the card holder, can substantially reduce
the risk at least to the card holder; the merchant may take on greater risk,
along with the issuing bank. However, we commented earlier on the variability
of such legal protection. The advertised guarantees to account holders and
the relatively low likelihood of any particular individual becoming a victim
versus the obvious convenience of online banking can reasonably account for
the popularity of online banking. The issues with CAs and SSL simply do not
pose a sufficient problem for these users to decline to use online banking and
similar services.
11.1.4 Limitations to our evaluation of risks
There are limitations to our evaluation of security risks. The argument advanced
so far is qualitative. A finer-grained analysis requires quantitative data and
suitable objective metrics, as suggested by Stolfo et al. (2011). In their work,
they describe at least three kinds of adversaries
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• nation state actor,
• expert operator adversary, and
• insider expert developer.
However, evidence from reported incidents suggests that casual, opportunistic
and accidental risks such as phishing and inadvertently losing storage media
should be of greater concern to most end-users of the type we are concerned
with in this work. Moreover, in the absence of strong compartmentalisation,
the technologies discussed in this paper are unlikely to deter or restrain any of
Stolfo et al.’s adversaries.
Moreover, the evaluation of value or impact is notoriously dependent on the
viewpoint of individual stakeholders. For example, Schneier refers to external-
ities (Schneier, 2007) and Ackerman et al. (1999) discuss the varying value of
different types of information according to individual preferences.
11.2 Deployment problems
The previous section has illustrated the value or lack thereof of user-visible
applications of cryptography for mitigating the risks in our user stories. We
now examine how these mitigations are sometimes undermined in practice.
There are two ways this undermining occurs:
• through lack of individual and organisational awareness for the need for
cryptography; and
• (mis)use of that cryptography.
The former point applies to both the selection and implementation of suitable
systems by organisations, as well as actual use by individual end-users. For
example, organisations may not recognise the need for encryption of sensitive
data. Even if an organisation does recognise this need, individual end-users
may not recognise it, or may disregard it for other reasons. Thus organisations
promulgate their need via policies and procedures. Other authors have also
commented on awareness, as well as technological and regulatory issues. For
example, Srivastava (2009) considers the Australian environment and remarks
“there is significant evidence of Australian businesses’ lack of awareness and
understanding of electronic signatures and the associated legislation, despite a
regulatory framework to facilitate their use”.
The correlation between risk and the awareness of need for cryptography is
unclear. This is illustrated in our user stories. For example, in the lowest risk
user stories such as social email, we would not expect any awareness of need.
At the other end of the scale such as online banking, awareness should be high
in part due to media coverage. Interaction with users suggests this is the case.
However, other user stories are problematic. The risks with handling removable
media are often not recognised, as evidenced in the UK by reports from the
Information Commissioner’s Office (Information Commissioner’s Office, 2011).
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Additionally, inadvisable software installation is implicated in malware infec-
tions on end-user computers. There is little surprising in terms of awareness
here, and it remains an open question how end-users can be made aware. Au-
tomation (discussed shortly) remains the most obvious option.
Mitigation of risk using cryptography is also undermined by intentional
or accidental misuse. Of particular interest is the usability of these tools.
We have previously asserted that users of interest to us have basic computer
skills, e.g., word processing and email. Requiring them to directly operate
cryptographic software poses a substantial problem when considering usabil-
ity (Whitten and Tygar, 2005). The problems continue, and anecdotal evidence
is in good supply. For example, Roger Grimes says
“Case in point: I routinely use Pretty Good Privacy (PGP) and
SMIME to secure e-mails and file transfers. Yet frequently, even
somewhat knowledgeable IT security people get confused about which
keys to use when. In order to for someone to send me encrypted con-
tent, I need to send that person my public key. Similarly, I need the
recipient’s public key so that I can send him or her encrypted con-
tent. We should never share private keys. That’s why they are called
private. Pretty simple — or so you would think. More often than
not, if the person isn’t overly familiar with PGP/SMIME, even if
they’ve been using it, they send me their private key.
“Being the good citizen that I am, I delete their private key and
ask again for their public key, explaining that with their private
key, I could be them, for all digital purposes. About half the newly
educated group then sends back my public key back or, if they’re
using PGP, their private key ring, which contains all their private
keys. You might think that I’m making this stuff up, but it’s pretty
much been this way with PKI and PGP exchanges since they were
invented. PGP’s own Phil Zimmerman has often written on this
subject.” (Grimes, 2009)
Simplicity of use is obviously beneficial. We might reasonably consider that user-
visible applications of cryptography have an inherent requirement for user effort,
and that deployment involves consideration of training requirements. However,
our end-users are trying to achieve relatively simple tasks; the computers are
a means to an end and our user might view the computer as nothing more
than a tool like a washing machine. Thus our argument is that in the scenarios
we consider, asking for any significant user effort to understand and correctly
use these cryptographic features is unreasonable and likely to result in non-
conformance and inadvertent misuse.
11.3 Endpoint security
The problem is not limited to the tools alone. General issues of security hygiene
arise such as leaving computers unlocked in vulnerable environments; indeed,
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some organisations such as universities and Internet cafes disable the screen
locks to prevent monopolisation of shared computers. Poor password practice is
common (Weber et al., 2008); a typical scenario is demonstrated by technicians
as illustrated by “Ted”, a technician who had arrived to update some software
for user “Alice” who had gone to speak to a colleague on the other side of their
open-plan workspace.
Ted (shouting across the room) “Alice, what’s your password?”
Alice (shouting back) “It’s (her real password).”
This particular workplace dealt with medically-sensitive information, and all the
workers were (at least in theory) aware of the need to control this information.
This same workplace, despite using a relatively modern mail server, insisted
that the only way for one user to access the email of another user while that
user was on long-term leave was to ask the absent user for her password. The
more appropriate mechanism involved auditable delegation via the mail server.
Thus the endpoints, the computers our end-users are using, are a significant
weak link. Data is accessible on these machines, and some store CMS keys with
no further protection. Gene Spafford is quoted as saying
“Using encryption on the Internet is the equivalent of arranging an
armored car to deliver credit-card information from someone living
in a cardboard box to someone living on a park bench.”
The changing consumer computer environment produces challenges: desk-
top machines are relatively well-understood, but the use of mobile devices
with operating systems such as iOS and Android pose additional challenges.
They are easier to steal, and in some cases, have a more limited access control
model (Hayashi et al., 2012).
Some attempts to secure endpoints address the difficulty of handling many,
good quality passwords. For example, IDSpace proposes a single user interface
that supports a range of existing identity management technologies (Al-Sinani and Mitchell,
2011). More ambitious is Stajano’s Pico (Stajano, 2011). This involves a pro-
posed hardware device that takes over the role of authentication. Of course,
this brings issues of authenticating the user to the Pico; the use of a swarm of
picosiblings (using k out of n secret sharing) and biometrics is suggested. A very
broad discussion of proposals for replacing passwords is due to Bonneau et al.
(2012).
Lastly, reidentification and recovery issues provide a potential weak point in
many deployed systems. Forcing password recovery via some means an attacker
controls is well known.
The problem of endpoint security relates back to issues of liability, and the
legal and contractual context of these transactions. ENISA states that
“many online banking systems dangerously rely on PCs being se-
cure, but banks should instead presume all customer PCs are in-
fected.” (ENISA, 2012)
On the same theme, Krebs comments
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“No online banking authentication system works unless it starts with
the premise that the customer’s machine is already compromised
by malware that gives thieves complete control over the customer
system. But for better or worse, the commercial banks have no
(dis)incentive to do much to improve the integrity of online banking
transactions because the current regulations effectively hold them
blameless when a customer loses money.” (Krebs, 2010)
The latter point is a significant point of variation. Recovery of funds lost to crim-
inal activity vary amongst different jurisdictions. Even where regulations appar-
ently are in the consumers’ favour, the reality can be different (Anderson and Bohm,
2008; Mason and Bohm, 2011).
11.4 Trust problems
So far, we have discussed the value of user-visible applications of cryptography
for the mitigation of risks in our user stories. We now take a more holistic view
and examine trust.
We place trust in cryptographic protocols which are believed to be sound,
and their implementation due to testing, review, credibility, etc. But for most
of our user stories, data confidentiality being an exception, these depend on
trusted third parties (TTPs): the certificate authorities. These TTPs are used
to bootstrap trust when there is no prior relationship between the first and
second parties. The users trust the CA to check the identity of the service
provider and correctly link the offered X.509 certificate to that identity.
However, we have seen that this trust may be misplaced: in section 6 we
noted issues with bootstrapping trust relationships (Perlman, 1999) and high-
lighted the Comodo and more recent compromises (InfoSecurity, 2011). In sec-
tion 7, we remarked that some of these issues can be mitigated by the local
network infrastructure, e.g., to allow opportunistic encryption, if that local in-
frastructure is trusted.
There are alternatives to a naming scheme that is world-wide (i.e., requesting
a certificate from a well-known CA); one is to use local, closed CAs. A further
option is web of trust style keying. These have been discussed at some length
earlier.
Others attempt to fix the existing CA environment include “pinning” which
whitelists public keys that are expected by a particular browser to make it harder
for untrustworthy certificate chains to go undetected. More interesting is the use
of multiple notaries as illustrated in the Perspectives project (Wendlandt et al.,
2008) and the subsequent Convergence add-on/daemon (Convergence, 2011):
both have users selecting notaries that they trust rather than relying on the de-
fault root CAs provided in (say) a web browser. However our earlier arguments
suggest that casual users will not be willing to engage in any additional work
to choose their trust relationships as there is no real improvement in their situ-
ation given the user effort required; this broadly matches with Herley’s conclu-
sions (Herley, 2009). A broader discussion about how trust operates in societies
26
is given by Schneier (2012).
Despite the issues with CAs described earlier, we may ask why companies
such as Verisign and Entrust amongst others can run a business selling SSL
certificates. We suggest that there are two major factors:
• regulatory compliance, such as the PCI SSC Data Security Standard (PCI Security Standards Council,
2010); and
• the inclusion of their root certificates in major web browser installation
packages.
For the relatively low cost per unit, an individual business will not need to
consider the purchase for long; yet the vendors have a wide range of potential
buyers and this is a business that scales well.
In practice, the TTP infrastructure might not be trustworthy but users use
it anyway, and when warning dialogues appear they are disregarded. Some
protocols, e.g., SSH, can record the known host keys and warn when it changes
in the style of key continuity management (discussed earlier in section 7.3);
similarly, we observe that many users disregard this and continue with their
connection. These points relate to the awareness and education issues previously
highlighted.
12 Conclusions
We have examined user-visible applications of cryptography. In part, our anal-
ysis has been structured by ten user stories in the context of the UK regulatory
environment. None of these are what would be classically considered “critical
systems”. Instead, they are routine, day-to-day scenarios. These user sto-
ries have been addressed by scenario-based analysis and we have examined the
balance of risk and value of user-visible applications of cryptography, and the
subsidiary deployment and trust issues.
We see that despite the apparent problems, particularly those associated
with deployment, endpoint security and trust (especially of CAs), the deployed
systems work relatively well. Our survey suggests that this is due to the presence
of mitigating factors, such as guarantees to bank account holders and recourse
to the legal system.
We return to the three categories of user-visible applications of cryptography
from section 5.2.
1. Direct, elective invocation of a cryptographic tool is very rare in the user
populations.
2. Indirect but still explicit, elective use of cryptography is valuable in the
Data confidentiality (10) user story, but does not appear elsewhere.
3. Implicit, background use of cryptography accounts for most of the usage.
Even where problems occur, we argue that users ignore or otherwise accept
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the risks (similar to Herley (2009)’s argument) or are content for other
mitigations to operate.
Any application of user-visible cryptography must make sense in that partic-
ular context. Our survey illustrates that the social/legal framework often does
not demand any cryptographic mechanism, or that users, software and/or the
infrastructure compromise its effectiveness. A significant exception is the use of
encryption to ensure data confidentiality, particularly for removable media. In
general, the potential security issues are essentially peripheral to the user’s con-
cerns; the users are trying to achieve some other objective using the computer
as a tool.
In the work leading to this survey, we see three particularly relevant areas
for further work:
• metrics to objectively establish quantitative measures for the value of user-
visible applications of cryptography in these types of user story;
• usability and education issues, as discussed by other authors in section 3;
and
• the balance of automation and control, which we discuss next.
We have remarked that the endpoint computing devices are a significant
vulnerability. We suggest the following definitions:
Automation This relates to the computer making decisions with minimal, if
any, user intervention, and incorporates elements such as robustness. For
example, if the user is asked to handle a failed verification that could be
due to network problems, incompatibilities of cryptography, inadvertently
modified files or malicious attack, this is a lack of automation.
Control This is the ability of a principal to dictate the usage of a computing
device, access to information, and may include some authority or opinion
over trust models and trust roots.
A locked-down computer, where the end-user cannot install anything that
is not approved by the original vendor could be viewed as overly paternal-
istic, but could, if the vendor has suitable judgement, increase the possible
automation in terms of certificate authorities. These are more computer
appliances than general purpose computers. Of course, this approach is
anathema to the free/libre open source software (FLOSS) community.
We remark firstly that automation and control are not necessarily opposing,
although there is an obvious tension. Moreover, they are potentially different
for each stakeholder, e.g., computer user vs. system administration vs. soft-
ware publisher vs. software developer. Both automation and control need to be
balanced against the overall risk.
Earlier comments about usability lead us to conclude that one partial mit-
igation is for software to require proactive changes of security settings rather
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than reactive changes. As an example, consider access to a website using an SSL
certificate that has not been suitably signed. A reactive approach allows the
user to add exceptions. Instead, the software could simply refuse access as an
extreme level of automation. The proactive approach requires that the user take
deliberate action unprompted by access to the web server: this gives the user
some control, but with reduced compromise of automation. Essentially, this is
to make it harder for users to say “I don’t care, just let me access the web site”.
A multitude of controls and fine-grained options has no value if the user will
click “okay, get on with it” no matter what; perhaps heavy automation with
strong controls is a suitable amelioration. This deserves further user-focused
study, perhaps by systematic repetition of our scenarios but examining the in-
teractions of particular interfaces more closely. A practical implication is that
simplified, constrained applications may be a short-term compromise that re-
duces the risks while still allowing sufficient utility.
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